THE ACCUSATION OF COMMUNISM AS
SLANDER PER SE
T IS GENERALLY held that an accusation of Communism in
writing is libellous and actionable per se.1 Any doubt as to the
defamatory character of such an accusation may well be settled by a
glance at Joint Anti-Fascist Comnmittee v. McGrath,2 where it was held
to constitute the gravamen of a good cause of action. There is some
question, however, as to whether an oral accusation of Communism is
likewise actionable per se.3
The law of slander almost universally distinguishes between types
of defamation-some being held actionable only upon proof of special
damages, and others being held actionable per se, damages being conclusively presumed.4 The pressures which forced this branch of the
law, in its budding years, into this rather arbitrary and much criticized
pattern are not germane to this discussion. It suffices merely to note
that this long-standing distinction seems to have had its genesis in the
common law courts' choice of a form of action for this class of wrongsnamely, an action on the case-when jurisdiction was first assumed over
them. From this, it inevitably followed that temporal damage rather
than impairment of the intangible interest of reputation was to be the
gist of the cause of action.5
As a result, unless allegedly defamatory words are of a sort which
automatically causes the presumption of damages to attach, the plaintiff must prove some specific pecuniary loss directly attributable to their
utterance as an essential element of his cause of action.0 Only after
such damages are proven may general damages be recovered for the
injury theoretically underlying the cause of action-impairment of the
plaintiff's reputation.' Since, however, there seems to be no logical reason to suppose that an injury to reputation will necessarily be accom1

See, e.g., Notes, 171 A.L.R. 709 (1947)

51 A.L.R. 1071 (1927).

" 34I U.S. 1z3, 139 (951).

'Compare Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 1o5 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1952),
Jennings, 254 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.1953).
'It

witth Lightfoot v.

would probably be clearer to say that in the case of slander per se special

pecuniary damages are not an essential element of the cause of action, but the terminology is traditional. See ODGERS, LIsEL AND SLANDER 2 (6th ed. i9Z9).
'Holdsworth,

Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q.

REV. 302, 304 (i924) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938).
(ist ed. 1935).
7 i STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 274. (st
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panied by provable money damages," the law, by conditioning a remedy
in some cases on such proof, only partially shields the interest it purports
to protect. The availability of a remedy for an admittedly defamatory
statement may thus depend on nothing more significant than, for example, whether the plaintiffs friends, who will no longer receive him,
formerly served him food during his calls.'
Where, on the other hand, a defamatory utterance is classifiable
as slander per se and damages are conclusively presumed, the defamer
is put upon proof of the truth of his accusation, his privilege, or some
other defense if he is to escape liability.' Of the several catagories of
defamation traditionally considered slanderous per se, only two are releone's
vant to the present problem: those imputing unfitness in respect of
12
office, profession, or business;" and those imputing criminality.
THE

ACCUSATION OF COMMUNISM AS AN IMPUTATION OF
PROFESSIONAL UNFITNESS

For a statement which imputes unfitness in respect of one's office,
profession, or business to be slanderous per se, it is necessary that at
least a substantial part of the general public would believe that, if the
accusation were true, the plaintiff would lack the qualities they expect
from one of his calling.' 3 Although some courts have required that
the allegedly defamatory words be spoken of the plaintiff with specific
reference to his office, profession, or business, the position of the
majority is:
It is not necessary that the defamer refer to the other as engaged
in the particular profession or calling in question. It is enough
if the statement is of a character to be particularly disparaging
of one engaged in such an occupation.'
The inclusion within this category of accusations that government
officials are affiliated with groups believed by a substantial segment of
the public to be disloyal and subversive is not novel. In 159o, an
accusation that a government official was not a "true subject" was held
to be actionable per se,' 5 as were charges that government officials were
8

PROSSER, TORTS § 92 at pp. 805-806 (Ist ed. 194.1).
' Moore v. Meagher, i Taunt. 39, 127 Eng. Rep. 745 (1807).
10 See generally Chapter 25, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938).
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(1938).
"1PROSSER, TORTS § 92 at pp. 8o2-8o4 (ist ed. 1941); RESTATEMENT, ToRTS
573, comment d (1938).
The question is ordinarily
1"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 573, comment e (1938).
one for the jury. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 615 (z), comment b (1938).
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"papists" in 1681I682,6 or that one was a "Jacobite" and supporter
of the Pretender in 1702." That the characterization of these utterances as slanderous per se was based on the plaintiffs' holding public
office clearly appears from the rejection of identical contemporary
actions brought by private persons.' 8
Adapting this theory to modern times, it was recently held in Remington v. Bentley"0 that an accusation that a government economist
was a member of the Communist Party was slanderous per se. Supporting this conclusion, the court noted that a Communist in our society
is widely considered to be both unfitted for government employment
and unsound as an economist." ° This thesis is further reinforced by
recent legislation designed to oust from government employment subversives generally and Communists particularly. The Internal Security Act of 195021 makes it unlawful for any member of a Communist organization to hold non-elective office or employment in the
federal government. The Hatch Act 2 requires the discharge from
federal employment of a member of any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government. Among the several analogous state enactments are statutes
in five jurisdictions specifically excluding from "state employment"
persons directly or indirectly affiliated with the Communist Party;2
statutes in three jurisdictions excluding such persons from "public office" 524 and statutes in five jurisdictions barring them from "elective
office."2 5 Of course, there is considerable overlapping, and similar
statutes in several other jurisdictions, although not expressly mention1"

Clarges v. Rowe, 3 Lev. 30, 83 Eng. Rep. 561 (68i)

Stawel v. Caune, 3

Lev. 5o, 83 Eng. Rep. 571 (1681) 3 Knightly v. Marrow, 3 Lev. 68, 83 Eng. Rep.
581 (1682).
"How v. Prin, 7 Mod. 107, 87 Eng. Rep. 1iz8 (170z).
18Compare Fowler v. Aston, Cro. Eliz. z68,
78 Eng. Rep. 523 (159z), and
Smith v.
10 88
"Id.
2164
'"53

Turner, Yel. io4, 8o Eng. Rep. 70 (16o8), kith cases cited note 16 supra.
F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
at 171.
STAT. 987, 992 (095O), So U.S.C.A. § 784 (95s).
STAT. 14 ( 939), s U .S.C.A . § ii8j 09 9).
"2Alaska Laws, 1949, c. 13, p. 2905 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4113 (c) (1947);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 876.05-876.10 (Supp. 1952) i GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-311-89-316
(Supp. 1949), as amended by Ga. Laws 1950, Vol. I, p. 2825 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24/
§ 8 (0949).
"Alaska statute supra note 235 Florida statute supra note 23; OKLA. STAT. tit. 5i,
§§ 3V-35 (1950).
"Alaska statute supra note 23i Florida statute supra note 23; Oklahoma statute
supra note 24; Arizona Laws 1949, H.R. 4, P. 570i GA. CoDE ANN. § 89-315 (Supp.
0949).
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ing Communists,
would also clearly seem to bar them from similar
26
positions.

Of course, in order to make out a case of slander per se under this
rubric, it is not at all necessary that the accusation, if true, statutorily
bar one from his calling.27

Nevertheless, where they exist, these stat-

utes would seem to afford a clear index of prevalent popular opinion
as to the fitness-or unfitness, if you will-of Communists for public
service, thus more readily conducing the conclusion that an accusation
of Communism directed against a public servant is slanderous per se.
The characterization of accusations that teachers are Communists
as slanderous per se seems equally compelling. The Association of
American Universities has recently stated its position to be that espousal
of Communism is, inter alia, an espousal of world revolution entailing
a surrender of intellectual integrity, and that "no person who accepts
such principles has any place in a University. '2' Furthermore, teachers
who are Communists are specifically excluded from state employment
by statute in Alaska,29 Georgia,3" New Hampshire, 3 ' and Texas, 2 and
by requirements set by administrative bodies pursuant to statute in New
York,3 Rhode Island, 34 and Virginia.35
2 In six jurisdictions, statutes exclude persons from elective office who are members of organizations which advocate forcible or unlawful overthrow of the government or programs of force, violence, treason, and sedition. Alaska and Florida statutes,
supra note 23; Oklahoma law, supra note z4; Kansas Laws, 1949, c. 246 § 1) p. 407J
MD. CODE ANN. Art. 85 A §§ io-x8 (1951); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 81-1309 (Supp.
1943). Eight jurisdictions bar such persons from "public office." Alaska and Florida
statutes, supra note z3; Oklahoma statute, supra note z4; Maryland statute, supra this
note; Kansas Laws, supra this note; HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 6oo-6t6 (1945), as
amended by Hawaii Laws 1945, Art. 131, p. 22, as amended by Hawaii Laws
1947, Art. 117, p. 26; ILL. REV. STAT., C. 127 § x66a (949); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 35a (1952).
Thirteen bar them from "state empoyment."
Alaska and Florida
statutes, supra note 23i Kansas, Hawaii, Illinois, and Maryland statutes, supra
this note; MASS. ANN. LAWS,
CIVIL SER. LAW §§ 12a, 23a

c.

264

§§

14,

15,

20

(Supp.

1952) ;

N.Y.

(x946)5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.1 (Supp.
1951); PA. ANN. tit. 53, § 352.13 (Supp. 1952); Oregon Laws x949, c. 311;
WASH. REV. CODE, c. 9.S9.040-9.1S.o6o (95x).
The statutes relating to state employment would seem in most instances broad enough to cover public teachers.
2"Authorities cited supra note 13.
2Time, April 6, 1953, p. 53.
"Alaska statute, supra note 23.
'*GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-311, 314, 316 (Supp. 1949).
" N.H. Laws 1949, c. 312, p. 414.

"TEx.
"N.Y.

REV. CIVIL STAT. Art. 29o8a (95.).
EDUCATION LAWS §§ 30o1-30o2 (953).

This is the controversial Fein-

berg law.
" See Rules and Regulations adopted January x, 1938, by the Rhode Island State
Board of Education governing issuance of teachers' certificates under R.I. Gen. Laws,
c. 176, §§ 1-z (1938).
"VA.
CODE § 22-207 (i95o).
The teacher's oath is embraced in the employment contract.
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Accusations of Communism directed against clergymen would also
seem to fall within this category because of the strong overtones of
atheism which such an accusation imports.
Although, as a practical matter, an accusation of Communism probably jeopardizes the economic as well as social status of other classes of
persons,3 the law takes no cognizance of this fact in the absence of
provable proximate pecuniary damages. Accordingly, only if the accusation of Communism is held to impute criminality can the average
individual avoid the onus of proving special damages as an essential
element of his cause of action for slander.
THE AccusATiON OF COMMUNISM AS AN IMPUTATION OF CRIME

Whether or not an accusation of Communism imputes a criminal
offense necessarily involves some inquiry into the existence and incidence of sanctions imposed for affiliation with subversive groups or
organizations. The legislation pertinent to such an inquiry is contained
in three federal statutes: (i) the Seditious Conspiracy Act,37 (2) the
Smith Act,3 8 and (3) certain portions of the Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 19505-9 and several state statutes.
The Seditious Conspiracy Act reads in part:
If two or more persons.., conspire to overthrow, put down,
or to destroy by force the government of the United States...
they shall each be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than six years, or both.4"
The Smith Act provides, inter alia:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any
society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or
encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government
by force or violence, or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates
with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing
the purposes thereofShall be fined not more than $ioooo or imprisoned not
more than IO years, or both.... 4 '
There is some question as to the effect of the Internal Security Act
of 1950 on the existing criminal law relating to subversive activities,
springing primarily from § 4(f) which reads in part:
"The public attitude seems fairly well expressed by a novel Montana Statute.
MONT. REV. CODE § 77-6o6 (19,t7).
",62 STAT. SoS (1948), is U.S.C.A. § 2384 (19s).
"62 STAT. 8o8 (1948), z8 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (195x).
"64 STAT. 987-1019 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 781-826 (i95i).
'OSupra note 37. Held applicable to Communist organization in civil litigation
in Burke v. American Legion of Ohio, 14. Ohio. App 24-3 (19ZI).
"Supra note 38.
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Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of
any other criminal statute.42 (Italics supplied.)
§ 17 of the same Act provides:
Existing criminal statutes. The foregoing provisions of this
Title (Title I, including section 4 (f)) shall be construed as being in addition
to and not in modification of existing criminal
43
statutes.
Since other sections of the Internal Security Act make registration44
mandatory for officers and members of Communist organizations,
§ 4 (f) would appear to have been designed to forestall claims that
compliance therewith would be self-incriminating. The words "or
of any other criminal statute" would thus appear to be solely intended
to perfect the registrant's shield against self-incrimination in this connection4 5 a conclusion fortified by adversion to the words "per se" and
to § 17 with its express disclaimer of any intention to modify the existing criminal law.
To construe § 4(f) more broadly-as eradicating every taint of
criminality attaching to membership in a Communist organization with
knowledge of its forbidden purposes-would present serious difficulties. First, such construction would ignore the words "per se." Second,
it would create an internal conflict within the Act between §§ 4(f) and
17. And, third, it would prefer Communists over other subversivesa result seemingly directly antithetical to the underlying legislative
intent to provide further safeguards against the menace of Communism, rather than relax the existing ones.4 Therefore, it would clearly
appear that § 4 (f) was not intended to and does not, in fact, alter the
older Smith Act.
It seems indeed doubtful that legislation designed to impede Communist activity could constitutionally be more direct and severe than
the existing federal statutes, 47 and most states which have enacted
similar legislation have not attempted to go farther. Even the Florida
statute, cast specifically in terms of "Criminal Communism," apparently
42 64 STAT. 99z (g5o),

So U.S.C.A. § 783

(f) (195).

364. STAT. 1003 (195o), 50 U.S.C.A. § 796 (2951).
"464 STAT. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 787 (195).

51 COL. L. REV. 619 (.95.).
" 64 STAT. 987-989 (1950), 5o U.S.C.A. § 781 (1951), U.S. CODF CONG. SERV.,
1950, Vol. 2, pp. 3886-3892, H.R. REP. 29805 96 Cong. Rec., pp. 14167-15770

"Legis.,

0950).

,7Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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requires proof of the same facts for conviction as does the Smith Act.4"
Only in Massachusetts is legislation dealing with Communist activity
more stringent. There the Communist Party is declared by statute to
be a subversive organization, and membership therein with knowledge
of its declared subversive character is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. 49
A violation of the Seditious Conspiracy Act involves the familiarly
intricate common law conspiracy with its congeries of technical and complex factual elements? ° Accordingly, to impute violation of this legislation, an accusation would seemingly have to be couched in rather
specific and technical terms. While such statements are possible, they
will probably be quite rare.
As a practical matter, then, the only statutes whose violations may
ordinarily be imputed from an accusation of Communism are the Smith
Act, those state statutes cut to the same pattern, and the Massachusetts
legislation discussed above. Since, as a general rule, a statement imputing a violation of the state statutes following the Smith Act pattern
would, in all probability, impute a violation of the Smith Act itself,
attention here will be focused on this latter legislation. The Massachusetts legislation, too, being sai generis, will be noted specifically,
albeit in a limited manner commensurate with its limited territorial
effect.
The practical effect of this legislation is that everywhere within
the United States today it is a felony to be a member of, or affiliate
with, any group or organization which teaches, advocates, or encourages
the violent overthrow of our government, knowing the character of
that group. Whether or not membership in the Communist Party and
its so-called "front organizations," outside of Massachusetts, falls under
the ban of this legislation is problematical. This problem, however, is
entirely separate from the question of whether or not a statement that
one is a Communist can reasonably bear the meaning that one has violated this legislation-and it is to the latter problem, not the former,
that attention is here directed.
The question arises as to the respective functions of court and jury
in determining whether a statement is slanderous per se as imputing a
crime. § 615(I) of the Restatement of Torts makes it dear that the
court is to decide whether the crime imputed is of sufficient gravity to
render the statement actionable per se. However, that section is silent
as regards the role of court and jury in determining a preliminary question when the statement is ambiguous, i.e., what crime, if any, has been
"8
State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 194.8).
c. 264, §§ i6-i6a (Supp. 1949).
"OInstructionsto Grand Jury, 3o Fed. Cas. io36, No. 18,272 (D.C. x86).

," MASS. ANN. LAWS,
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imputed. The comments to § 614 indicate that the jury plays an
important part in such cases. Perhaps a dearer statement of the rule,
although in complete harmony with these comments, is to be found in
Mr. Blake Odger's work:
So too, in cases of slander, the Judge usually decides whether
the words are, or are not, actionable per se.... If the defendant's
words cannot reasonably bear the meaning ascribed to them by
the innuendo, and the Judge is dearly of opinion that the words
without that meaning are not actionable, he will stop the case.
So, too, if the words even with the alleged meaning are not
actionable (though pleaders seldom err on that side). But in all
other cases, where there is any doubt as to the true construction
of the words, the Judge leaves the question to the Jury.r'
The court, then, must first determine whether or not the utterance will
"reasonably bear" the meaning that the plaintiff has violated the law.
In the instant context, the problem, therefore, is whether or not an
accusation of Communism will "reasonably bear" the meaning that
one has violated the Smith Act or the Massachusetts legislation noted.
A violation of the Smith Act embraces at least three elements: (i)
membership or afliliation with (2) an organization or group teaching,
advocating, or encouraging the overthrow of the government by force
and violence (3) with knowledge of this forbidden purpose. In determining whether a bare accusation of Communism can "reasonably
bear" the meaning, in the sense of factual content, that these prerequisites have been met, the words must be given the meaning "ordinarily
attached thereto by persons familiar with the language used. 5 2
Taking the elements of the crime in the order of their difficulty, it
would seem accurate to say that the Communist movement in the United
States is popularly thought to be dedicated to the overthrow of the
existing form of government by force and violence. Among the reasons
expressly adduced for the enactment of the Internal Security Act of
1950 was the conviction that the Communist movement is part of a vast
interlocking conspiracy seeking the illegal seizure of the reigns of
government.5
Implicit recognition of the validity of this belief is
reflected in various state "anti-subversive" statutes-most graphically
illustrated by those of Massachusetts."4 Various legislative committees
" ODGERS,

789

(ist

LIBEL AND SLANDER

94-95 (6th ed. 1929).

See

also PROSSER, TORTS

ed. 1941).

R ESTATEMENT, TORTS § 563, comment c (-938) ; ODGERS, op. cit. svpra note
51, p. 935 SEELMAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER 639-640 (2d ed. 1941).
Stepra note 46.
14

Supra note 49.
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have reached and published the same conclusion,5 5 and the Subversive
Activities Control Board has rendered decisions which it would be difficult to sustain on another basis. 56 A witness may properly refuse to
answer questions relating to his affiliation with the Party on grounds
that his answers may tend to incriminate him.57 And, while courts
have refused to take judicial notice that the Communist Party and its
affiliated organizations are a conspiracy to overthrow the government
by force and violence,5 they might judicially notice that this is the
prevailing belief at this time." Accordingly, an accusation of Communism would seem capable of reasonably bearing an imputation of
at least this element of the offense.
Membership or affiliation with the group is another element of the
crime. Although it is possible, after some reflection, to conjure up an
unassociated intellectual who merely believes in Marxist principles, the
natural inference flowing from an accusation of Communism would
seem to be membership or affiliation with the general subversive movement which has made the name familiar. Thus, it would follow that
such an accusation could reasonably bear the meaning that one is a
member or affiliate of an organization proscribed by the Smith Act.
With respect to the remaining element of the offense-awareness
of illegal purpose-law unites with logic in permitting the question to
go to the jury. As a matter of logic, it would seem that an accusation
of Communism can more reasonably bear this meaning than the meaning that one is ignorant of the organization's illegal purposes. Some
sort of mental state is essential to the commission of almost any crime
and it is generally not required that the pleader aver that the slanderer
meant that the accused individual had the requisite mens rea to commit
a crime otherwise imputed.60 The same rule would seem applicable to
the mental element involved in a violation of the Smith Act. In any
I

ioo

THINGS YOU SHOULD

KNOW ABOUT COMMUNISM, pp.

13-14,

published

by House Committee on Un-American Activities,
COMMITTEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OF

N.Y.

1949; PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
LEGISLATURE, 1939, pp. 176-179.

"5E.g., Brownell v. Communist Party of the United States, Docket 5s-ioi, April

20, 1953, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2530 (April 28, 1953).
"TBlau v. U.S., 340 U.S. 159 (1950), rehearing denied, 34-1 U.S.

91z (1950);

Doran v. U.S., 181 F.zd 489 ( 9th Cir. 195o); Estes v. Potter, 183 F.zd 865 (5th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1950).
"8Carlson v. Landon, 187 F.2d 991 ( 9 th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 524 (952),
rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952) 5 Stasiukevich v. Nicholls, x68 F.2d 474 (Ist
Cir. 1948).
In Dennis v. U.S., 183 F.zd
" RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 43 (5th ed. 1936).
2o (2d Cir. 1950), Judge Learned Hand noted the prevalence of such opinions regarding Communists, in relation to the problem of securing an impartial jury.
" Keller v. Dean, 57 App. Div. 7, 67 N.Y. Supp. 842 (19oo); Miller v. Miller,
S Johns. 74 (1811).
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event, an accusation of Communism would seem capable of reasonably
bearing the imputation of knowledge of the illicit purposes which the
average hearer attributes to Communist organizations.
Thus, it would seem that an accusation of Communism can reasonably bear the meaning, in the sense of factual content, that the accused's conduct has satisfied the elements essential to a violation of the
Smith Act, and, a fortiori, the Massachusetts legislation described above.
Accusations of Communism may be protean in form, and understandably may bear other meanings, admittedly defamatory, but not
slanderous per se. Defamatory language often presents such ambiguities, for people as a rule do not trouble to consult the applicable legislation in order to slander in the proper statutory language." Since,
then, the only limitations on the manner in which the accusation of
Communism can be made are those imposed by the vocabulary, intelligence, and imagination of the defamer, whether or not an imputation of crime is justifiable will depend in each case on the particular
words used and the surrounding facts and circumstances. It may,
therefore, be illuminating to examine analogous cases in which courts
have or have not permitted juries to find imputations of crime.
It has been held in New York that the statement that one is an
"Anarchist" may properly be found by the jury to impute a violation
of the state criminal anarchy law." Permitting a jury to find that the
word "Blackleg" imputed the statutory offense of dishonesty at cards
was affirmed in an early English case by an evenly divided Common
Bench. 3 The epithet "White-Capper" raised similar problems in an
Indiana case, but these were left unanswered, the case being decided
on other grounds. 4 The word "Welcher" ' 5 has engendered a split of
authority, while juries have not been permitted to find that the words
"cheat"0 0 or "swindler " 117impute criminal offenses.
The crucial question posed by these cases seems to be this: When
does a word bear a meaning sufficiently unequivocal to allow a jury
to find therein an imputation of a specific criminal offense? None of
these cases states any standards for making this determination. Nevertheless, it would seem that the word "Communist" has today acquired
a meaning as unequivocally derogatory and criminal in its way as did
0'

SEELMAN,

"Von

op. cit. supra note

52, at 692.

Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 130, 87 N.Y. Supp. 968 (1904).

"3 Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376, 157 Eng. Rep. S16 (x858).
"'Divers v. Meredith, 147 Ind. 693, 47 N.E. 143 (1897).
"' See minor court opinions collected in ODGERS, Op. cit. supra, note 51 at pp. 43,
io8.
soMaclntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y. Supp. 786 (1914); ODOERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 43 (6th. ed. 1929).
"7ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 66

Perlman v. Golding, L.J. (N.Y. Jan.

o, 1931).
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"Anarchist" and "Blackleg" in their day, thus meeting the unarticulated standards of clarity and universality of meaning adopted in past
cases-whatever they may have been. If this conclusion is correct, an
accusation of Communism, coupled with an innuendo drawn in terms of
the Smith Act, would present a proper case for jury consideration, if
the cause of action were otherwise sound.
Assuming that a jury may properly determine whether such an
utterance is slanderous per se as an imputation of crime, the Restatement of Torts, § 614(2), and the comments thereto, indicate that the
jury is to be guided by the rule of § 563:
The meaning of a communication is that which the recipient
correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands it was intended to express.
This rule was designed to discover the "meaning" of a defamation only
in the sense of its factual content and understandably leaves unanswered
the specific question of whether or not an admittedly defamatory utterance imputes a criminal offense. Thus, even after the permissible
factual content is determined, a further inquiry into the legal significance of the facts so communicated is essential. To this end, possibly
four questions must be answered. First, must the hearer have grasped
the factual content of the statement? Second, must he have realized
that the statement imputed criminality? Third, is an understanding
that general criminality has been imputed sufficient, or must the hearer
understand that a specific offense has been charged? Fourth, must
the hearer correctly understand the applicable criminal law?
The first inquiry is that to which the rule of § 563 of the Restatement of Torts is addressed and properly can be answered only in the
affirmative. Surely, it is obvious that, unless the hearer actually grasps
the factual content of the communication, there has been no communication and, consequently, no defamation has occurred.
The second inquiry--whether the hearer must realize that the facts
communicated amount to an imputation of criminality-is more difficult. Just as the defamer does not usually slander in terms of the
criminal code, so the average hearer's mind does not analyze in terms
of the criminal law. Two generally disparate approaches have been
taken to this problem: the one inquiring into the actual understanding
of the hearers, and the other disregarding this point, either silently or
by presuming a complete knowledge of the criminal law in the hearer,
which amounts to the same thing.
As regards the first approach, there is some authority for the proposition that, where hearers reasonably understand a defamatory utterance to impute a crime, it is actionable per se, despite the fact that the
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conduct described is, in law, entirely innocent.68 It is difficult to quarrel with the extension of liability on this basis. The logical converse
of this proposition would be that, where the conduct imputed by the
defamatory utterance is in fact criminal, but the hearers are unaware
of this, the defamatory statement is not actionable per se. The law
has not, however, adopted this corollary rule, as the cases taking the
second approach demonstrate.
With respect to the second approach, although the statement has
been repeated innumerable times that the hearers must understand the
words used as an imputation of crime,"9 close analysis casts great doubt
on its validity. Individual hearers are not ordinarily permitted to
testify as to the meaning they placed on the defamatory utterance, 0
although all surrounding facts and circumstances are admissible to show
its meaning.71

This would seem to indicate that the actual understand-

ing of the hearer is not significant. This theory seems to be supported
by the cases which hold that an imputation of crime made concerning
acts "known to be innocent" by the hearers is not actionable per se,
thus effectively attributing to the hearers a fictitious knowledge of the
criminal law.72 There are, moreover, other cases which do not expressly impute any knowledge of the criminal law to the hearers, but
rather get over the problem by ignoring it. In Brooks v. Harson,7"
for example, the defendant stated that the plaintiff, owner of a dairy,
kept his cows in with a diseased horse and that their milk was impure.
A jury was permitted to find an imputation of the statutory misdemeanor of trafficking in impure milk. And in Selig v. Alexander,74 the
defendant stated that he had not authorized the plaintiff to sell his
brandy as Hennesy's and that plaintiff had no authority to do so. This
was held to be sufficient imputation of the statutory crime of an offense against a trade-mark. Perhaps Frazier v. Grob,76 in its colorful
way, best illustrates the case where the defamatory statement is understood in its factual content, but evokes in the hearer moral disapproval
rather than a realization that a criminal statute has been violated. In
all these cases the jury was permitted to find that the defamatory state8

" Note, 29 HARv. L. REV. 857 (1916).

"Kegerreis v. Van Zile, 18o App. Div. 414,
rath v. Nellis, 17 How. Pr. 72 (N.Y. z859).

167 N.Y. Supp. 874 (917);

Wol-

ed. 1940). See also ODGERS, op. cit. strura
EVIDENCE § 1971 (rd
'WIGMOREnote 66 at 105.
" SEEL.MAN, op. cit. supra note 52 at pp. 634-638.
"2 Pike v. Von Wormer, 5 How. Pr. 171 (N.Y. 1850); Divers v. Meredith, 147
47 N.E. 143 (1897).
Ind. 693,
x
739
N.Y. 83 (1883).
74 173 N.Y. Supp. 187 (918).
194 Mo. App. 405, 183 S.W. 1083 (1916).
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ments imputed crimes, although it seems doubtful that they were reasonably understood by the actual hearers to have been charges of crime.
As a result, there is doubt as to whether or not the hearers of a
defamatory statement must realize that a crime has been imputed, the
probability being that they need not. If, indeed, this is so, then an
accusation of Communism may permissibly be found to impute a crime,
despite the prevailing popular ignorance of the applicable law. Although dicta abound there seems to be no direct authority on this question. The cases discussed above are only noted because it seems
impossible to explain them on any basis other than a negative determination of this question, although they do not expressly discuss it.
On the other hand, however, there is no better authority for the
proposition that the hearers must realize that criminality has been imputed. But, assuming that they must, this poses our third and fourth
inquiries; namely, whether the hearer must recognize the defamatory
utterance as imputing general criminality or a specific offense, and
whether the hearer must correctly understand the applicable criminal
law.
Concerning the third inquiry, the word "Communist" probably is

not actionable per se as an imputation of general criminality.

This

follows from the fact that such epithets as "crook" and "gangster,"

which also carry this connotation, have not generally been held to be
actionable per se." The majority view would apparently require an
imputation of some specific offenses-although there is some authority
to the contrary. 77 Thus, in Devany v. Quill, where the defendant,
during World War II, termed the plaintiff "The agent of Fascism in
America today" and "The agent of Hitler in America," the court stated:
And while it is not a charge of specific crime, it is a charge
of any and all such crimes which "the agent" of Hitler or Fascism in this country had committed or which he might be expected to commit as such agent. At least the jury might have so
found.

7s

This case probably can be supported as an extension of the holdings
that an oral charge of felony is actionable per se, though the crime is
not specifically named. 7 It would agree as well with the older English
cases holding that an accusation of a "deed without a name" may be
" Villemin v. Brown, 193 App. Div. 777 (192o) 5 Hofstadter v. Bienstock, z13
App. Div. 807, (1925); PROSSER, TORTS § 92, p. 805 (1st ed. 1941) 5 SEELMAN, op.
cit. supra note 5z at pp. 63o-633.
7
" Weiner v. Leviton, 23o App. Div. 312 (1930).
78 64 N.Y.S.zd

733, 736 (946).
"'NEVELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 91 ( 4 th ed. 1924).
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actionable per se. 80 But the force of this argument is mitigated by the
fact that an accusation of neither Fascism nor Communism as graphically imports violation of the criminal law as does an accusation of felony or the language used in the "deed without a name" cases. Such cases,
moreover, have been severely criticized, 8 ' and an action based on their
underlying theory would seem to be on very treacherous ground.- It
would be preferable to allow the accusation of Communism to stand
on its own feet, if it will, as an accusation of one of the specific offenses
discussed above.
With respect to the fourth inquiry, if the hearer must correctly
understand the applicable criminal law, an accusation of Communismor of any crime, for that matter-would almost never be slander per se,
as an imputation of crime. 2 Fortunately, it seems unlikely that any
court would knowingly impose such a requirement. A more reasoned
approach would seem to be that any realization by the hearer that some
specific crime has been ascribed to the plaintiff is sufficient to make the
statement actionable per se. It would seem accurate to say that, if
the hearer believes, as does a substantial group of people today, that
"it is a crime to be a Communist," this would suffice to make an accusation of Communism actionable per se.
To recapitulate, the first step in the interpretation of a statement
alleged to be slanderous per se as an imputation of crime is a determination by the court as to whether or not the defamatory statement, coupled
with a suitable innuendo, will reasonably bear the meaning that the
plaintiff has violated a sufficiently serious criminal statute. It seems
probable that an accusation of Communism, with an innuendo, would
reasonably bear the meaning that the plaintiff has violated the Smith
Act. In Massachusetts, it would almost certainly reasonably bear the
meaning that the plaintiff has violated the statute relating to membership in subversive organizations. The problem here is whether the
term "Communist" has picked up factual connotations embracing the
principal elements of these offenses dearly and definitely enough. It
would seem that it has done so, when measured by the standard of the
past cases. Since the accusation can reasonably bear the necessary factual content, the case, then, is one for the jury.
Exactly what standard a jury must apply in order to determine
whether a defamatory utterance constituted an imputation of crime is
"oSee cases collected in NEWELL, op. cit. supra note
GERS, op. cit. supra note 66 at 36.
" SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note 5z at pp. 632-633.

79 at pp. 92-93; and in

OD-

" The average hearer simply does not understand the criminal law applicable to
the commonest and most obviously actionable accusations. For example, although he
realizes that the statement that "Doe killed Roe" imputes a crime, he would be unable
to give a satisfactory statement of the elements of this familiar offense.
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somewhat doubtful. Certainly, it must find that the factual content of
the statement was understood by the hearers. There is some question
as to whether the jury must find also that the hearers understood the
conduct imputed to be criminal. But, if the jury must so find, they
probably must find that the hearers understood the term "Communist"
as charging a specific offense, and not merely that Communists are
persons who generally commit crimes. The jury certainly need not
find that the hearers correctly understood the applicable criminal law.
To date, four cases have directly considered the question of whether
an accusation of Communism may be found to impute a criminal offense. None of these cases is remarkable for its analysis of the problems involved. The dicta in Remington v. Bentley, 83 reaching a
negative result, does so by adopting an error made in certain libel cases,
creating a false distinction between "libel per se" and "libel per quod."
The direct negative holding in Keefe v. O'Briens5 seems more concerned with expressing moral disapproval of Communists and Communism than with formulating a legal rationale as to why the case
should not be permitted to go to the jury. The same result was reached
in Ohio in Pecyk v. Semoncheck. s6 The most recent case, however,
Lightfoot v. Jennings,8 7 held the accusation of Communism actionable
per se as imputing a violation of the Smith Act. This result would
seem clearly correct.
It is unfortunate that legal rights should depend on tiresome and
illogical distinctions of the sort that pervade the entire law of slander.
Since it is generally agreed that the requirement of "temporal damages"
is basically erroneous,"" it would seem proper in any genuinely doubtful
case to hold that a defamatory accusation amounts to slander per se,
thus avoiding a decision which may turn on the accident of provable
temporal damages. What is really needed is a thorough reform of the
law of slander; but it is not encouraging to notice the dearth of results
that has followed advocacy of reform by some of the finest scholars
in the field.8"
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